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Abstract
As the institutions of Palestinian self-government have evolved, it has become increasingly
apparent that the principal challenge for Palestinian decision-makers will be to establish structural
and legal bases for the emergence of a civil society and a dynamic economy. The hurdles that
confront Palestinian decision-makers in this regard are considerable, and may be divided into two
groups. First, Palestinian leaders must recognize and resolve the “structural” challenges reflected
in the political and economic realities imposed by current events. These include the peace pro-
cess with Israel, the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (“PNA”), and the more recent
creation of the Palestinian Council. The second group of hurdles facing Palestinian authorities
are legal. These challenges embody the legal fallout of the region’s tumultuous recent history,
which has resulted in an awkward amalgam of laws derived from legislation enacted under the
auspices of various rulers who have controlled the West Bank and Gaza (collectively, “Palestinian
Territories”) at different periods during this century. This Essay addresses both groups of hurdles,
structural and legal, in turn.
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FORWARD
The following Essay was written in an attempt to condense
into a few pages various observations and impressions resulting
from nearly thirty months of continuous involvement in eco-
nomic and legal aspects of the Middle East peace process.
Ninety-five percent of it was written immediately before the re-
newal in February 1996 of terrorist bombings in Israeli cities and
the subsequent prolonged closure of the Palestinian Territories.
Following these events, certain changes were added to the text in
an attempt to address the tragic loss of life and the current pre-
cariousness of the peace process.
The Essay was originally composed in a spirit of cautious op-
timism, recognizing the seriousness of the hurdles before the Is-
raeli and Palestinian peoples, but believing in their dedication to
putting decades of tragic conflict and suffering firmly behind
them. The later additions, however, were written during a pe-
riod of sadness and anxiety. As this book goes to print, none can
tell how deeply the peace process has been damaged. The deci-
sion to publish the Essay in spite of the present difficulties was
therefore not easy. Nonetheless, irrespective of the fluid polit-
ical situation, the basic underlying realities and interests remain
the same. Hopefully, the discussion in this Essay of specific hur-
dles to stability and development will be of some use to those
who, sooner or later, will have to find solutions to these
problems.
I. PARAMETERS OF THE PROBLEM
The current Middle East peace process is built, in large part,
on two sea changes in the psychology of conflict that has
plagued the region for decades: Israeli recognition of Palestin-
* Keith C. Molkner, Director, Law & Development Program, Israel/Palestine
Center for Research and Information ("IPCRI"), Jerusalem; J.D., Boalt Hall, 1993.
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ian aspirations to self-determination and Palestinian recognition
of the legitimacy of the Israeli State. In recent years, bilateral
and multilateral negotiations between Israel and the surround-
ing Arab states have introduced important additional elements,
such as: full peace with Jordan; active ties with Morocco, Oman,
and Qatar; lower intensity but important ties with several other
Arab states in North Africa and the Gulf; and ongoing peace
talks with Lebanon and Syria. These other developments, how-
ever, were made politically possible by means of mutual recogni-
tion on the part of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organi-
zation ("PLO"). Furthermore, continued improvement in Arab-
Israeli relations will remain dependent on future progress in Is-
raeli-Palestinian rapprochement. Thus, successful implementation
of the agreements on Palestinian self-rule is critical to a compre-
hensive and durable Middle East peace.
The successful implementation of Palestinian self-rule, in
turn, relies on two major criteria: the establishment of stable
and effective governance, and real economic growth that is
rapid, profound, and sustained. Leaders both within and with-
out the region have repeated that if it is to succeed, the peace
process must deliver real and visible improvements in the lives of
ordinary people. In the case of the Palestinians, this primarily
means that disorder, violence, and wide-scale poverty must cease.
As the institutions of Palestinian self-government have
evolved, it has become increasingly apparent that the principal
challenge for Palestinian decision-makers will be to establish
structural and legal bases for the emergence of a civil society and
a dynamic economy. Only by creating a new environment that
protects individual liberties and encourages entrepreneurial ac-
tivity will the current process enable the Palestinian people to
reap the benefits of peace. The hurdles that confront Palestin-
ian decision-makers in this regard are considerable, and may be
divided into two groups. First, Palestinian leaders must recog-
nize and resolve the "structural" challenges reflected in the polit-
ical and economic realities imposed by current events. These
include the peace process with Israel, the creation of the Pales-
tinian National Authority ("PNA"),' and the more recent crea-
1. The Palestinian National Authority refers to the interim self-rule authority cre-
ated upon Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho in the summer of 1994. See
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tion of the Palestinian Council.2 The second group of hurdles
facing Palestinian authorities are legal. These challenges em-
body the legal fallout of the region's tumultuous recent history,
which has resulted in an awkward amalgam of laws derived from
legislation enacted under the auspices of various rulers who have
controlled the West Bank and Gaza (collectively, "Palestinian
Territories") at different periods during this century. This Essay
addresses both groups of hurdles, structural and legal, in turn.
II. STRUCTURAL HURDLES
The structural hurdles to development have unfolded in
lockstep with the establishment of Palestinian self-government.
The optimism among Palestinians during late 1993, when Israel
and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim
Self-Government Arrangements, 3 cooled as it became apparent
that Palestinian aspirations for full independence, democratic
government, and economic prosperity would not occur immedi-
ately. Contrary to popular expectations, the end of Israeli mili-
tary rule over Gaza, Jericho,4 and, later, other West Bank cities5
did not automatically lead to an improvement in economic life
or the establishment of a genuine rule of law. In fact, the
changes led to new economic, political, and administrative
problems.
A. Economic Problems
The most dramatic of the structural problems facing Pales-
tinian decision-makers is the painful economic transition cur-
rently underway. Unemployment has risen sharply since the
Michael Kelly, In Gaza, Peace Meets Pathology, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, § 6 (Magazine),
at 56 (discussing formation of PNA).
2. The Palestinian Council, or AI-Majlis Falistini, in Arabic, is the legislative body
elected by Palestinian voters on January 20, 1996.
3. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 [hereinafter Declaration].
4. The end of military rule in these areas took place following the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho under the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the
Jericho Area. Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, May 4, 1994,
Isr.-PLO, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement].
5. The end of Israeli military rule took place following the redeployment of Israeli
troops outside West Bank cities under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO [hereinafter Interim Agreement] (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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early months of the peace process, approaching sixty percent in
Gaza alone. Over 100,000 Palestinians who formerly worked in
Israel found themselves jobless as the Israeli Government imple-
mented its policy of "separation" between the two peoples.6 The
results for the Palestinian economy have been devastating.
Initially, Palestinian leaders hoped that new enterprises
would be initiated in the areas under Palestinian self-rule, pro-
viding alternative sources of employment. The shortage of capi-
tal in the Palestinian economy, however, made it imperative that
Palestinian leaders attract substantial investment by diaspora
Palestinians7 and other foreign investors. Unfortunately, such
foreign investment has yet to materialize. Thus, while many new
companies have been registered, comparatively few factories and
other job-creating enterprises have been established.
In addition to unemployment, the Palestinian economy suf-
fers from restrictions on the movement of Palestinian goods into
Israel. While Israel and the PLO signed a customs union agree-
ment nearly two years ago providing for free movement of indus-
trial goods and most agricultural produce,' the Israeli security
closures constitute a formidable barrier to the entry of Palestin-
ian goods. Not only has this non-tariff barrier resulted in largely
one-way Israeli-Palestinian trade, it has also interfered with Pales-
tinian exports to third markets and hampered commerce be-
tween Gaza and the West Bank.
Finally, the financial and banking sectors of the Palestinian
economy are only now emerging from twenty-seven years of mar-
6. Separation, or haftada, in Hebrew, was first put forward as the response of the
Government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the terrorist attacks by Palestinian ex-
tremists attempting to torpedo the peace process by conducting suicide bombings in
Israeli cities. The practical effect of this policy was the initiation of "security closures"
during which Palestinians were not allowed to pass the checkpoints into Israel. It was
resurrected by the Government of Prime Minister Shimon Peres in response to the even
worse suicide bombings of early 1996.
7. SeeJoel Brinkley, Comment by Baker Angers Shamir, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, at A5
(discussing Palestinian diaspora).
8. Cairo Agreement, supra note 4, annex IV, 33 I.L.M. at 696; Interim Agreement,
supra note 5, annex V. The Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government
of the State of Israel and the PLO Representing the Palestinian People was signed as a
separate agreement in Paris, but was subsequently attached to the Gaza/Jericho Agree-
ment as Annex IV. A revised form of the Economic Protocol was later included in the
Interim Agreement as Annex V. For purposes of this Essay, "Economic Protocol" refers
to the original Agreement as signed in Paris. References to the newer version cite to
the Interim Agreement.
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ginal existence. Arab and foreign banks existing in the West
Bank and Gaza prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War were closed by
Israeli Military Order shortly after the entry of Israeli forces. Di-
rect financial links to the Arab world were severed and Palestini-
ans came to rely on gray market provriders of financial services,
such as money changers and money lenders.9
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, sev-
eral Jordanian and Palestinian banks quickly moved to open or
reopen branches in the West Bank and Gaza. Presently, about
twelve banks operate over fifty branches in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, roughly a 500% increase in institutional coverage since
September 1993.10 Furthermore, total deposits increased ten-
fold from 1993 to 1995.11 Despite this dramatic expansion, the
Palestinian banking sector continues to be characterized by poor
regulation and insufficient service. Lending remains heavily
constricted and conventional wisdom attributes this, in part, to
bank-facilitated capital flight. Moreover, the lack of a central
check clearance facility and the prevalence of dishonored checks
seriously impede the development of an efficient system of pay-
ments. The larger effect of such problems is an insufficient har-
nessing of domestic financial resources for the development of
the Palestinian economy.
B. Political Problems
While the economic problems described above exert the
strongest direct effect on the majority of Palestinian individuals
and families, the problems that attract the greatest attention of
foreign governments, international media, and the Palestinian
leaders themselves, are essentially political. These problems im-
plicate the central question of the peace process: Will the Pales-
tinian leadership be able to provide political stability and main-
tain its internal legitimacy while simultaneously fulfilling its obli-
gations to Israel and concluding further Israeli-Palestinian
9. Two Arab banks, the Bank of Palestine and the Cairo Amman Bank, were li-
censed to reopen in the 1980's, but the services they provided remained inadequate.
Indeed, it was common for no interest to be paid on savings deposits and lending was
woefully scarce. By 1993, these two banks operated only thirteen branches for the en-
tire West Bank and Gaza Strip.
10. PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PALESTINIAN BANKING SEC-
TOR STATISTICAL REVIEW Xii-XiV (1995) [hereinafter PEPRI].
11. Id.
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negotiations? For the peace process to succeed, the answer must
be affirmative.
The Palestinian leadership has been walking a political
tightrope ever since the negotiations known as the "secret Oslo
channel" 2 became publicly disclosed. Historically, the PLO
strove to be a broad-based national organization that, although
dominated by Fatah,"3 was willing to accommodate all move-
ments dedicated to the "liberation" of Palestine. Since the Fatah
leadership undertook, on behalf of the PLO, to recognize Israel
and to foreswear the use of violence, however, a rift has opened
in Palestinian society between "moderates" who support working
towards Palestinian statehood within the framework of transi-
tional autonomy, and "extremists" who reject any negotiated so-
lution that concedes maximalist Palestinian claims. The Pales-
tinian leadership thus finds itself under pressure both from
Israel and the West, particularly the United States, to crack down
on extremists and from a substantial portion of its own constitu-
ency to renounce the new partnership with Israel and the
United States.
The conflicting political pressures that Palestinian leaders
face are well-illustrated by the issue of the Palestinian Cove-
nant. 4 The Covenant, essentially the PLO's charter, calls for the
destruction of Israel and implicitly rejects a peaceful solution to
the conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made the re-
nunciation of these provisions a precondition to Israeli recogni-
tion of the PLO and the signing of the Declaration of Princi-
ples.15 Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, PLO Chairman
Yasser Arafat wrote a letter to Prime Minister Rabin declaring
these articles inoperative and undertaking to make the necessary
changes in the Covenant. Despite repeated demands by Israel
and the United States that the changes be made, however, and
12. See Serge Schmemann, Killing of Bomb 'Engineer' Unites Palestinian Factions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at AS. The "secret Oslo channel" refers to Israeli-Palestinian talks
that were held quietly in Norway and resulted in the Declaration of Principles. Id. The
channel's existence became public knowledge in early September 1993. Id.
13. Fatah, or "victory," is the dominant faction headed by PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat.
14. The Palestinian National Charter, reprinted in THE IsRAEL-ARAB READER 366,
366-71 (Walter Laquer & Barry Rubin eds., 4th ed. 1984).
15. See Steven Greenhouse, Mideast Accord: In Washington; Twist to Shuttle Diplomacy:
U.S. Aide Mediated by Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at Al (discussing inception of
Declaration of Principles).
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despite repeated promises by Chairman Arafat to do so, the Cov-
enant remains unchanged.1 6
Failure to amend the Covenant revealed the precarious po-
sition of the PNA, at least prior to the elections of January 20,
1996.17 Political reality dictated that the PNA satisfy minimum
Israeli expectations, particularly with regard to the prevention of
violence against Israelis, while preserving a demeanor of dia-
logue and national unity that included, rather than excluded,
the Islamicists and other members of the emergent opposition.
When a series of bus bombings in Israeli cities in late 1994 and
early 1995 nearly brought the peace process to a standstill,18
however, it became increasingly problematic for Palestinian lead-
ers to speak in English of peace and coexistence while continu-
ing to speak in Arabic of fihad.19
Following the repeated spectacle of Palestinian police ar-
resting large numbers of suspects after each terror strike against
Israel and then releasing them a few days later, ° the PNA acted
to assert its authority. Various tactics were used to put an end to
instability and violence. Attempts were made to coopt, marginal-
ize, intimidate, or incarcerate opponents of the regime. Special
closed courts were established to try "security offenders" under
military procedures without providing proper defense counsel.2'
Journalists, newspaper editors, and human rights activists who
spoke out found themselves unemployed or, in some cases,
jailed.22 In one case, Al-Nahar, a major Palestinian newspaper
with an "errant" editorial policy, was closed for an extended pe-
riod.
The Palestinian elections were optimistically expected to
presage the arrival of a new period of democratization and polit-
ical calm. Generally, the populace deemed the elections a suc-
16. See Tzachi Hanegbi, A One-Sided Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A21 (discuss-
ing Covenant and Arafat's refusal to amend it).
17. See Arafat Sets Jan. 20 as the DateforFirst Paestinian Elecions (AP), Dec. 14, 1995,
at A12 (discussing elections and role of PNA and Palestinian Council).
18. See Serge Schmemann, Bus Bombing Kills Five in Jerusalem; 100 Are Wounded, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1995, at Al (discussing impact of bombings on elections).
19. fihad is the Islamic term for holy war.
20. See Steven Emerson, High Noon for Arafat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1994, at A27
(reporting on release of Hamas operatives one day after their arrest).
21. See Clyde Haberman, Arafat's Police in Gaza Widen Crackdown on Muslim Radicals,
N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at Al (discussing closed courts).
22. Id.
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cess. The voting, which was monitored by large numbers of local
and international observers, was by most reports orderly and
fair.23 Yet, the fact that Hamas24 and other opposition move-
ments boycotted the election, and that heavy-handed tactics
were used to promote favorable press coverage of Fatah candi-
dates and suppress opponents,25 revealed the limits on stability
and genuine democracy in the nascent Palestinian political sys-
tem. Despite such concerns, however, in the immediate after-
math of the elections, it was generally thought that the new
Council would enjoy greater popular legitimacy than the
unelected authority which preceded it. Well-wishers hoped that
this expanded legitimacy would lead to greater freedom of ac-
tion regarding relations with Israel, increased internal stability,
and heightened respect for the rule of law.
Tragically, the Palestinian political system and the peace
process itself were subjected to a devastating shock before the
Council had ever convened. The recent bombings of Israeli bus-
ses and a street corner by Hamas terrorists in late February and
early March, 1996,26 resulted in an indefinite cessation of Israeli-
Palestinian talks and a protracted closure of the Palestinian Ter-
ritories.27 Support for the peace process has fallen dramatically
among both Israelis, concerned for their security, and Palestini-
ans, suffering from the effects of the closure.28 It remains to be
seen whether the Palestinian political leadership will be able
both to recapture Palestinian popular support for the peace pro-
cess and convince Israel that it is doing all it can to break the
terrorist infrastructure and contain extremism. It also remains
to be seen whether the Palestinian leadership will continue to
23. See Serge Schmemann, Arafat Backed in First Voting by Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1996, at Al (declaring overall success of elections) [hereinafter Arafat Backed in
First Voting].
24. Hamas refers to the largest and most active Palestinian extremist group. In
Arabic, Hamas is an acronym for "Islamic Resistance Movement."
25. See Arafat Backed in First Voting, supra note 23, at Al (discussing boycott); Joel
Greenberg, Palestinians Trying Out Elections, Warts and All, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1996, at
AIO (discussing tactics used to suppress opponents).
26. See Serge Schmemann, Bombings in Israel: The Overview; 2 Suicide Bombings in
Israel Kill 25 and Hurt 77, Highest Such Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at Al (reporting
on aftermath of bombings)
27. Id.
28. See Serge Schmemann, Bombing in Israel; Israeli Rage Rises as Bomb Kills 19, Imper-
iling Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al (reporting on effect of bombings on Israelis
and Palestinians).
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have Israeli partners in peacemaking following the Israeli gen-
eral elections in May, 1996. Support among the Israeli public
for the peace process has fallen dramatically, as have the chances
for reelection of Prime Minister Shimon Peres.29 Chairman
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership have come under tremen-
dous pressure to dissolve the infrastructure of terrorist groups
inside the Palestinian Territories. Meanwhile, the Israeli Gov.-
ernment has declared that if Arafat fails to do so, Israel will. In
the wake of the bombings, Chairman Arafat banned all armed
groups inside Palestinian-controlled territory and committed his
regime to confiscating their weapons and arresting their hard-
core members. Action by the Palestinian security forces to full),
implement these commitments will probably result in serious
armed resistance. Failure to take meaningful action, however,
will, in all likelihood, permanently doom the peace process.
C. Administrative Problems
In addition to the economic and political problems dis-
cussed above, Palestinian development also faces hurdles engen-
dered by administrative problems. These structural problems af.
fect the quality of daily administration by Palestinian officials of
the territories under their jurisdiction. As a result of these
problems, Palestinian governance is less efficient and effective
than it would otherwise be.
One source of inefficiency stems directly from the interim
structure of the peace process. This structure is based on a grad-
ual transfer of power and responsibility from the Israel Defense
Forces ("IDF") to a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Author-
ity over a five-year transitional period, followed by the negotia-.
tion of a final settlement." While the history of mutual mistrust.
may have made this formula a tactical necessity designed to grad-
ually build confidence on both sides, it is nonetheless extraordi-
narily difficult for Palestinian decision-makers to embark upon
long-term planning in the absence of a final status agreement.
In particular, Palestinian leaders and officials are presently in
the awkward position of administering the powers and territories
29. See Serge Schmemann, The Trials of a Peace Seeker - A Special Report; Terrorism
Forces Peres from Brink of Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at Al (analyzing effect of
violence on peace process and Peres Government).
30. The Declaration of Principles articulates the transfer of power, while the Cairo
and Interim Agreements implements it.
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under their jurisdiction without assurance concerning what the
final extent of these powers and territories will be. Thus, they
are uncertain whether Palestinian self-rule will ultimately take
the form of an independent state, a confederation with Jordan,
or some other, as yet undisclosed, arrangement.
Additional administrative problems derive from the geo-
graphic division of the territories under Palestinian self-govern-
ment into two major territorial units: the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. Prior to the implementation of Palestinian self-rule,
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had functioned as two distinct
administrative units since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.3" This long
separation continues to have important consequences for the ad-
ministration of the territories under Palestinian self-government.
For example, the court systems of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip remain separate and distinct, each governed by its own
rules and procedures. While the PNA took some steps to harmo-
nize the two judicial systems under the administrative framework
of its Ministry of Justice, it remains unclear how or whether the
two systems will ultimately be unified.
Still more important, as will be discussed below, two sepa-
rate legal systems exist in the Palestinian Territories. Whereas
the legal system of Gaza derives from English common law, the
legal system of the West Bank is based on the legal tradition of
Jordan, which is heavily derived from civil law. That Palestinian
officials must currently administer two different legal systems
further contributes to the administrative complexity of Palestin-
ian self-governance.
Administrative difficulties such as these are considerably
heightened by the non-contiguous geography of the West Bank
and Gaza. It is often difficult or impossible for Palestinians, in-
cluding public officials, to get permission to cross Israeli territory
in order to move between the two territories. Various plans have
been discussed regarding creation of a safe passage through
Israel for travelers moving between Gaza and the West Bank.
None of them, however, have yet been put into action. Further-
more, those parts of the West Bank that are currently under vari-
31. The West Bank was occupied byJordan in 1948 and annexed in 1951, whereas
the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian occupation in 1948 but was not annexed. Israel
occupied both territories in 1967 but preserved their administrative separation by ap-
pointing one military commander for the West Bank and another for the Gaza Strip.
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ous forms of Palestinian self-rule, commonly referred to as Areas
"A" and "B," are themselves non-contiguous. Thus, passage be-
tween them, while not as difficult as passage between the West
Bank and Gaza, still involves travel through the Israeli-controlled
portions of the West Bank, known as Area "C."3 2 Lastly, an addi-
tional impediment to efficient and effective administration is the
fact that while the Palestinian Council has jurisdiction over civil
affairs in both Areas "A" and "B" in the West Bank, PNA police
can operate only in Area "A."33
A final set of administrative problems stems from corrupt
practices within the PNA. Stories abound concerning individu-
als who have exploited their positions within the PNA for per-
sonal gain. While these stories may well be exaggerated, it gen.-
erally appears that the PNA has suffered from a certain level of
corruption. Among other allegations, it has been credibly re.-
ported that certain Israeli companies have successfully employed
improper financial inducements to gain monopoly positions
with respect to the import of certain goods into the Palestinian
market. One may hope that the newly-elected Palestinian Coun-
cil will be able to disclose and reduce, or eliminate, such corrupt
practices.
III. LEGAL HURDLES
The present legal structures in the Palestinian Territories
also constitute a major hurdle to development. As noted above,
the existence of two separate legal systems for Gaza and the West
Bank constitutes a source of inefficiency that hampers economic
development. Furthermore, not only are the legal systems of
Gaza and the West Bank inconsistent with one another, they are
also each internally disharmonious.
The internal disharmony of the Gaza and West Bank legal
systems stems from the fact that each system is constructed from
a confoundingly complicated body of diverse legal sources. The
32. Interim Agreement, supra note 5. Area "A" is comprised of the eight Arab
cities of the West Bank: Bethlehem, Hebron (where only part of the city is under Pales-
tinian self-rule), Jenin, Jericho, Kalkilya, Nablus, Ramallah, and Tulkarm. Area "B" is
comprised of smaller towns and villages in which Palestinian jurisdiction encompasses
civil affairs, but in which Israel is responsible for internal security. Area "C" consists of
the Israeli-controlled remainder of the West Bank, including rural areas, military zones,
and Israeli settlements.
. 33. Interim Agreement, supra note 5.
1996] 1429
1430 FORDHAMINTERATATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1419
laws of Gaza are comprised of British Mandate ordinances, as
amended and supplemented by Egyptian and Israeli military or-
ders. The laws of the West Bank, in contrast, are comprised of
Jordanian statutes, as amended and supplemented by a different
set of Israeli military orders. In addition, the legal systems of the
West Bank and Gaza both contain a residue of Ottoman law in
certain legal fields, as well as new enactments by the PNA. Thus,
inconsistency between the laws of the West Bank and Gaza is ag-
gravated by the internal disharmony and complexity of the two
legal systems.
Furthermore, the British and Jordanian ordinances and
laws that comprise the statutory basis of the legal systems in Gaza
and the West Bank, respectively, are also generally anachronistic.
The British ordinances are entirely comprised of pre-1948 laws,
while theJordanian laws date from beforeJune 1967. These laws
often embody legal thinking and terminology that are outdated
and unsuited for modern economies. Additionally, many of
these laws have been amended by cumbersome Israeli military
orders that are often insufficiently hospitable to commercial and
other economic activity.
While thousands of military orders were promulgated by the
Israeli military authorities in the West Bank and Gaza beginning
in 1967, they have never been fully compiled and consolidated.
Furthermore, a significant number of military orders and policy
directives have not even been made available outside the IDF
and the Civil Administration.34 Thus, a certain level of legal un-
certainty exists in the West Bank and Gaza regarding the laws in
force. Finally, because the amendments by military order were
generally drafted to serve the needs of Israeli security rather
than Palestinian development, several of the military orders
amend laws in a manner that renders them overly burdensome
and restrictive.
The disharmony, uncertainty, and confusion associated with
the legal systems in the West Bank and Gaza have resulted in
various concerns on the part of international investors and busi-
ness interests regarding the legal vacuum in the Palestinian Ter-
34. The Civil Administration was the administrative and civil affairs apparatus of
the Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza. It was dissolved in Gaza
upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces and its jurisdiction in the West Bank is now limited
to Area "C" territories.
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ritories. Despite such problems, however, the legal system func-
tions surprisingly well on a day-to-day basis. Business is con-
ducted successfully and routinely in the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestinian courts operate under well-established procedures
and adjudicate a wide variety of commercial cases. In addition,
alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes are frequently em-
ployed and carry the force of cultural tradition behind them.
These mechanisms include meditation, conventional arbitration,
and traditional practices of conciliation known as Sulha.s5
The primary legislative challenge presently before the newly
elected Palestinian Council is to review the body of laws in the
West Bank and Gaza and to identify priority areas for legal re-
form. Such reforms should be built on the existing legal struc-
tures to which Palestinians are accustomed, but should eliminate
harmful anachronism, incongruity, and irrationality. By thus
modernizing and harmonizing commercial legislation in an or-
ganized and well-considered fashion, the Palestinian Council will
be able to systematically eliminate the existing legal hurdles to
economic development.
The remainder of this Essay briefly surveys three legal fields
that the Palestinian Council is likely to address in the near fu-
ture: investment law, banking law, and tax law. Each of these
fields currently presents various hurdles to economic develop-
ment.
A. Investment Law
As mentioned above, local and foreign investment in the
Palestinian economy is one of the foremost requirements of Pal-
estinian economic growth. This was recognized early on in the
peace process, as evidenced in an annex to the Declaration of
Principles, which calls for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in the
creation of a "Financial Development and Action Program" to
encourage international investment in the region. While such
a cooperative program has yet to be established, the PNA placed
35. Sulha is a traditional method of conflict resolution embedded in centuries of
Arab tradition. According to this method, a dispute is brought before one or more
respected community leaders or elders who mediate the dispute and reconcile the par-
ties. The decisions are generally treated with respect and compliance.
36. Declaration, supra note 3, annex III, 32 LL.M. at 1537-40.
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considerable emphasis, almost from the date of its inception, on
the creation of a new Palestinian investment law.
At the time of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho
and the creation of the PNA, the legal structure in place for en-
couraging investment in the West Bank and Gaza was disharmo-
nious, confusing, and inadequate. This legal structure consisted
of a 1967 Jordanian law,3 7 two Israeli military orders, 8 and a set
of policy directives issued by the Israeli Civil Administration in
the West Bank. 9 These laws, orders, and directives relied on
discretionary decision-making and heavy administrative control
while granting insufficient incentives and legal guarantees to in-
vestors. The PNA earmarked the replacement of this legal struc-
ture with a modern, unified investment law representing the first
commercial law reform.
A drafting period of several months ensued during late 1994
and early 1995 that saw the preparation and circulation of a
number of draft Palestinian investment laws. Ultimately, the fi-
nal draft was submitted by the PNA Ministry of Economics,
Trade, and Industry to Chairman Arafat and the PNA Council of
Ministers. Following its approval of the draft, the PNA promul-
gated the Law on the Encouragement of Investment ("Invest-
ment Law") on April 29, 1995.40
The Investment Law sets forth a new legal structure for the
encouragement of investment and revokes all prior inconsistent
legislation. For the time being, however, the Law has entered
into force only in those areas of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip that fall within the legislative jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Council, 41 specifically, the Gaza Strip (excluding Israeli settle-
ments and the IDF base) and Areas "A" and "B" of the West
37. Jordanian Temporary Law No. 1 for 1967: The Encouragement of Capital In-
vestment Law.
38. The Encouragement of Capital Investment, Military Order 1055 of 17 June
1991 (Gaza District) (Isr.); The Encouragement of Capital Investment, Military Order
1342 of July 7, 1991 (Judea and Samaria) (Isr.).
39. The Encouragement of Investment Act (as amended 21 November 1991); Civil
Administration of Judea & Samaria (Judea and Samaria); Unnumbered Directives on
The Encouragement of Foreign Investment.
40. Law on the Encouragement of Investment, reprinted in David P. Fidler, Foreign
Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Pales-
tine, 19 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 529, 603-10 (1995) [hereinafter Investment Law].
41. Interim Agreement, supra note 5, art. 18. Article 18 reads, "The Council has
the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article 17 of the Agreement, to adopt
legislation." Id.
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Bank. According to the Law, the Council's jurisdiction is to be
extended over eighteen months to the remaining Area "C" terri-
tories, except for those areas that are linked with issues to be
negotiated in the "final status talks."42 Concurrently, the Israeli
military orders and Civil Administration directives concerning
investment will remain in force throughout the interim period
in all areas not transferred to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Council.
The Investment Law represents a major improvement over
the earlier laws, military orders, and directives in force in the
West Bank and Gaza. The law is marred, however, by several
features that, in effect, constitute obstacles to the creation of a
legal structure that will be genuinely attractive to investors.
These legal hurdles fall into three basic categories: the Invest-
ment Law's guarantees and protections for investors, incentives,
and the administrative framework.
1. Investor Guarantees
The Investment Law provides several guarantees of the
rights of investors, including prohibition of expropriation, guar-
anteed national treatment of foreign investors, and free repatria-
tion of profits and capital."3 One problem with these guaran-
tees, however, is that their terminology and language is not fully
consistent with internationally accepted legal usage. By thus de-
viating from standard international language, the Investment
Law engenders a lack of clarity regarding the interpretation of
the guarantees. The Investment Law poses a second problem
related to the guarantee of investor rights in its provision stating
that Palestinian investors will be given a "priority" in the
purchase of tax-exempt fixed assets from other investors. 44
While it is unclear from the Investment Law how this priority is
to be implemented, it appears to compromise the guarantee of
national treatment of foreign investors. A final problem is that
while the Investment Law gives Palestinian Courts jurisdiction to
42. Interim Agreement, supra note 5, art. 17. The relevant final status issues are
settlements, Jerusalem, and borders. Declaration, supra note 4, art. 5, 32 I.L.M at 1526.
Final status talks are slated to begin in the Spring of 1996 and to last no more than
three years.
43. Investment Law, supra note 40, arts. 9, 18, at 606, 608.
44. Id. art. 16, at 608.
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adjudicate investment disputes,45 it fails to make reference to the
option of using independent arbitration or various international
dispute resolution mechanisms in appropriate cases. As foreign
investors often have greater confidence in such mechanisms
than in local courts, the Investment Law would be more encour-
aging to such investors if it included a statement recognizing the
right of investors to make use of such mechanisms where agreed
upon by the disputants or where called for under international
agreements.
2. Incentives
The incentive structure created by the Investment Law con-
sists of exemptions from income taxes and dues for a specified
number of years. 46 The Investment Law provides for both "regu-
lar exemptions" (fixed term) and "exceptional exemptions" (dis-
cretionary term). The Investment Law also establishes the
Higher Palestinian Agency for the Encouragement of Invest-
ment ("Agency"), which is responsible for administering the ex-
emptions. Only investment projects which have been approved
by the Board of Directors of the Agency ("Board") may receive
exemptions.
The major shortcoming of this incentive structure is its reli-
ance on excessive exercise of discretion by the Agency and the
Board. Generally, under the Investment Law, investment incen-
tives should "to the extent possible be automatically granted, di-
rectly linked to the type of activity to be encouraged and equally
extended"47 to foreign and local investors alike. Under the In-
vestment Law, however, applications for exemptions are to be
approved or rejected on what is essentially a discretionary basis.
While the Investment Law provides that the Board must state
reasons for its decision on an application,48 it does not provide
clear and binding criteria to be used in reaching the decision.
Furthermore, the Investment Law fails to provide firm guaran-
tees against arbitrary actions that alter the status of exemptions
after they are granted. As a result of such reliance on open-
45. Id. art. 20, at 609.
46. Id. art. 1, at 603. "Dues" are defined as customs duties and purchase taxes on
machinery, equipment, and raw materials. Id.
47. Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Investment, 7 ICSID REVIEW: FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 302 (1992).
48. Investment Law, supra note 40, art. 13, at 607-08.
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ended discretionary decision making, the Investment Law fails to
provide an incentive structure that is rational and predictable.
3. Administration
The framework for administering the Investment Law is
centered on the Board of the Agency. The Board is comprised
of fifteen members, each of whom serves a three-year term.49
The primary functions of the Board include carrying out the
business of the Agency, deciding on applications for exemptions,
and suspending or revoking exemptions for violations of the
law.50
The major problem regarding this administrative frame-
work is that the Board appears to be less a professional body of
impartial civil servants than a collection of disparate, potentially
competing political interests. Thirteen of the fifteen members
of the Board are political appointees selected by the Chairman
of the PNA. Furthermore, only one of the members is a full-time
employee of the Agency. This highly politicized administrative
structure creates the potential that political interests and institu-
tional biases of members stemming from their activities outside
the Agency will unduly influence the Board's decision-making.
This potential could undermine investor confidence in the im-
partiality of the administration of the Investment Law.
A related criticism of the administrative framework created
by the Investment Law concerns the fact that the general tone
and emphasis of the Investment Law seem to be placed on ad-
ministration as a tool of bureaucratic control rather than a
means of efficient and liberal treatment of investment. This
tone and emphasis is exemplified by, inter alia, the failure of the
Investment Law to provide a mechanism for challenging a rejec-
tion of an application for benefits. Furthermore, while the In-
vestment Law does provide a right of appeal in the case of inves-
tors whose exemptions are suspended or revoked by the Agency,
the appeal must be made directly to the Chairman of the PNA. 1
This type of mechanism for direct appeal of administrative dis-
putes to the chief executive is highly irregular and further re-
49. Id. art. 3(2), at 604.
50. Id. arts. 5, 11-17, at 605, 606-08.
51. Id. art. 19, at 609. In Arabic, the term for chairman, Raees, is also often trans-
lated as President.
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flects the Investment Law's tendency towards heavy administra-
tive and political control.
While these legal hurdles represent genuine obstacles to the
encouragement of investment in the Palestinian economy, the
promulgation of a uniform Palestinian investment law represents
a substantial step forward in the creation of a modern Palestin-
ian legal infrastructure. It should also be remembered that the
Investment Law represents the first achievement of Palestinian
commercial law reform. Moreover, problematic features of the
Investment Law can be corrected by enacting amendments as
the commercial law reform process continues to develop. The
inauguration of the newly elected Palestinian Council may cre-
ate opportunities for specialized legislative review and, where
necessary, amendment, of legal enactments promulgated by the
PNA prior to the elections. If this is the case, the Investment
Law would be an obvious candidate for such review.
B. Banking Law
The emergence of a strong banking sector in the Palestin-
ian Territories is one of the primary prerequisites for economic
development. The large-scale return of Palestinian and foreign,
mostly Jordanian, banks to the West Bank and Gaza over the last
two and one half years is a positive development that has already
had a pronounced effect on savings patterns. Previously limited
to using Israeli banks, money changers, or various informal fi-
nancial institutions, Palestinians now have access to modern
banks located in all the cities and major towns of the West Bank
and Gaza. The expansion of the banking sector, however, has
highlighted the inadequacy of the present banking laws and en-
gendered several new problems.
The banking laws presently in force in the West Bank and
Gaza are outdated and incomplete. The most important bank-
ing statute in effect in the West Bank is the Jordanian Banking
Law of 1966.52 Its equivalent in Gaza is the British Mandate Pal-
estine Banking Ordinance of 1941.1' While numerous Israeli
military orders have directly or indirectly amended the banking
law in the Palestinian Territories, many of them were never
52. Jordanian Temporary Banking Law No. 94 of 1966.
53. Palestine Mandate Banking Ordinance No. 26 of 1941, published in The Pales-
tine Gazette No. 1134, Supplement No. 1 (Oct. 9, 1941).
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given effect or enforced.54 In fact, the volume and disorganiza-
tion of the military amendments has rendered it at times diffi-
cult to determine precisely what the current law requires. This
complicated legal structure constitutes a serious hurdle for regu-
lators, the banking sector, and the entire financial infrastructure
of the Palestinian economy.
Efforts to reform the legal structure as it applies to the bank-
ing industry must address three major types of problems cur-
rently afflicting the banking sector. First, as the newly estab-
lished Palestinian Monetary Authority5 ("PMA") has not yet
fully developed its licensing and supervisory capacities, banks are
operating in the Palestinian Territories with a minimum of regu-
latory oversight. Second, despite the dramatic increase in the
number of operating banks, the provision of essential banking
facilities, such as lending and checking services, remain well be-
low required levels. Third, and finally, Palestinian businessmen
and economists have raised serious concerns that foreign banks
are exporting Palestinian deposits to finance lending operations
abroad, precisely at a time when the Palestinian economy is suf-
fering from an acute shortage of capital.
These problems figure prominently in the effort currently
underway to reform the banking laws and regulations in the
West Bank and Gaza. It remains uncertain whether this effort
will ultimately result in a total unification of the banking laws of
the West Bank and Gaza, or whether the harmonization will be
more limited and gradual. In any case, modernization of bank-
ing and related laws is a high priority of the PMA. Such reforms
are particularly necessary with respect to four legal fields: licens-
ing, supervision, system of payments, and lending.
1. Licensing
The Bank of Israel was responsible for licensing banks in
the West Bank and Gaza from June 1967 until the May 1994 sign-
ing of the Economic Protocol. The Economic Protocol provided
for the creation of the PMA as the licensing authority for bank-
54. The Bank of Israel often simply applied the Jordanian and British Mandate
statutes in supervising Palestinian banks, despite the existence of superseding military
legislation.
55. Cairo Agreement, supra note 4, annex IV, art. IV(1), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 6, annex V, art. IV(1). The Palestinian Monetary Authority
("PMA") acts as the central financial institution within the PNA. Id.
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ing activities in the Palestinian Territories. The PMA was for-
mally constituted by an executive decree issued by Chairman
Arafat in January 1995.
Once the Israeli-Palestinian peace process opened the way
for Arab and foreign banks to return to the Palestinian Territo-
ries, Jordanian banks quickly moved to assume a dominant posi-
tion in the region. Since the PMA did not come into being until
1995, and since Israel andJordan had already concluded a Mem-
orandum of Understanding on banking cooperation by Decem-
ber 1993, Jordanian banks applied to the Bank of Israel for
licenses to open branches in the Palestinian Territories until the
PMA was established. The PNA subsequently agreed with the
Jordanian Government that the PMA would retroactively ap-
prove licenses issued to Jordanian banks by the Bank of Israel
during this period. Most of the banks presently operating in the
Palestinian territories are, therefore, operating under conditions
set forth in the licenses issued by the Bank of Israel prior to the
cancellation of its supervisory role in the Palestinian Territories.
The PMA is now in control of bank licensing in Gaza and
Areas "A" and "B" of the West Bank. However, the PMA is not
yet fully staffed and is operating in an atmosphere of a regula-
tory vacuum. The PMA is not yet in a position to properly evalu-
ate the necessary qualifications of owners and managers of banks
applying for licenses to operate in the Palestinian Territories.
Nor has it established regulatory guidelines for evaluating appli-
cations in light of the economic needs of the Palestinian Territo-
ies. Further institutionalization of the PMA and development
of legislation and regulations promulgated by the Palestinian
Council and the PMA, respectively, are fundamental require-
ments if bank licensing procedures in the Palestinian Territories
are to move beyond the present interim arrangements.
2. Supervision
The PMA recently established a banking supervision depart-
ment responsible for monitoring the proper operation, stability,
solvency, and liquidity of banks operating in the Palestinian Ter-
ritories. The PMA has successfully enlisted a number of quali-
fied supervisors with experience acquired in various Arab and
Western countries. The level of professional competence of
these supervisors is generally thought to be quite high. How-
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ever, the supervision department is presently operating without.
an established regulatory structure.
The banking laws currently in force in Gaza and the West
Bank fail to articulate the responsibilities and powers of a super-
visory authority. The British Mandate and Jordanian statutes
provide no basis for the imposition of prudential regulations and
the carrying on of "on-site" inspections by a supervisory author-
ity. Furthermore, the need for such regulation and inspection is
particularly great, because the absence of a lender of last resort
for Palestinian banks, as opposed to Jordanian or other foreign
banks operating in the Palestinian Territories, has created con-
siderable uncertainty regarding their stability, solvency, and li-
quidity.
Presently, Jordanian and other foreign banks operating in
the Palestinian Territories continue to be supervised by their re-
spective home supervisory authorities. These home authorities
generally act as a lender of last resort for those banks falling
under their supervisory responsibility. For example, Jordanian
banks, which account for a large majority of deposits in the Pal-
estinian Territories, are supervised by the Central Bank of Jor-
dan, which not only monitors the banks but also protects them
through its role as lender of last resort. Thus, Jordanian and
foreign banks are, at least objectively, more secure than local Pal-
estinian banks. This situation places Palestinian banks in a dis-
advantageous position that will continue until the PMA is more
thoroughly established, both in terms of financial resources and
regulatory authority.
3. System of Payments
Checks are written in the Palestinian Territories in Israeli
sheqels, Jordanian dinars, and U.S. dollars. No central clearing
house system exists for the Palestinian territories. Checks clear
in different ways depending on the currency in which they are
denominated. Inefficiencies in check clearance have impeded
the more widespread dissemination of checks as a means of pay-
ment.
While sheqel-denominated checks can be efficiently cleared
through the Israeli central clearance system in Tel Aviv, dinar-
denominated checks are generally cleared bilaterally between lo-
cal banks. This practice can be inefficient and burdensome,
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since each local bank must credit and debit separate accounts
with a growing number of other banks, and must separately as-
sess the credit of each of these banks. Dollar-denominated
checks are cleared on a collection basis, for instance, through an
actual transfer of money rather than through the crediting and
debiting of accounts, a procedure that is slow and relatively ex-
pensive. The establishment of a central clearing facility for dinar
checks would improve efficiency. However, any such facility
would have to be closely coordinated with the Central Bank of
Jordan.
The presentation of checks without adequate backing funds
on account ("bad checks") further compromises the acceptance
of checks as a means of payment. The large volume of bad
checks written in the Palestinian Territories constitutes a signifi-
cant problem, and the original banking statutes in effect in the
West Bank and Gaza fail to provide a mechanism to deter this
practice. An Israeli military order provides for restrictions to be
placed on a checking account in the event of repeated check-
bouncing on any given account. 56 However, this order has been
largely ignored by banks in the Palestinian Territories. Thus, an
important priority of Palestinian banking law reform should be
to create an effective legal mechanism to enforce coordinated
restriction, or other penalties, against offenders.
4. Lending
The volume of financial lending by banks in the Palestinian
Territories is well below the needs of the market and the re-
sources of banks. Most banks operating in the West Bank and
Gaza are over liquid, in some cases maintaining loan-to-deposit
ratios of only twenty percent. Furthermore, the majority of lend-
ing carried out by banks in the Palestinian Territories is reput-
edly in the form of small-scale overdraft facilities, which account
for eighty-six percent of all lending by Palestinian banks.57
Worse still, it is widely believed that foreign banks are facilitating
capital flight by transferring Palestinian deposits to more attrac-
tive markets in Jordan and elsewhere. Whether or not this is the
case, the low level of lending in the Palestinian Territories con-
56. Israeli Military Order Regarding Checks Without Coverage, No. 1024 (Judea
and Samaria) of 1982.
57. PEPRI, supra note 10, at xv.
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stitutes a grave hurdle to development of the Palestinian econ-
omy.
The primary impediment to lending in the Palestinian Ter-
ritories has been the inability of banks to enforce secured lend-
ing agreements through the court system. There is no collateral
lending law in Gaza, and the Jordanian Collateral Lending Law
of 1953, currently applicable in the West Bank, is outdated and
in need of replacement. Furthermore, during the period of Is-
raeli occupation, Palestinian courts refrained from issuing fore-
closure judgments against defaulting debtors, as execution of
the order would require cooperation with the IDF. Additionally,
the strong Palestinian social taboo against evicting an owner
from his land may continue to make foreclosure difficult or im-
possible in cases where real property is put up as collateral. Fi-
nally, the absence of a modem land registration system in the
West Bank and Gaza poses further obstacles to the use of real
property as security for collateral lending.
While Palestinian courts can now rely on the Palestinian po-
lice to enforce foreclosures, the procedures for doing so have
not yet been tested. A modern Palestinian collateral lending law
clarifying these procedures would substantially alleviate the con-
cerns of banks regarding judicial enforcement of collateral loan
agreements. Such legislation should harmonize the foreclosure
procedures in Gaza and the West Bank, provide safeguards for
defaulting debtors, such as a generous notice provision and a
right of debtor redemption, and include language that can be
incorporated into collateral lending contracts stating that the
bank may exercise the foreclosure option if the debtor fails to
redeem the loan within the notice period. Concurrently, a
somewhat more interventionist approach could be used to di-
rectly address the problems of over liquidity and capital flight by
issuing regulations requiring reasonable loan-to-deposit ratios.
C. Tax Law
The establishment of an efficient taxation system is a third
prerequisite for Palestinian economic development. The pres-
ent tax laws, derived from disharmonious, anachronistic statutes
amended by a cumbersome body of military orders, pose serious
hurdles for both Palestinian taxpayers and tax collectors. These
hurdles include burdensome rules and procedures, a lack of
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legal clarity, and excessive discretionary powers granted to the
tax authorities. Furthermore, the exercise of tax powers by the
Palestinian Council is far more restricted by agreements with
Israel than those powers exercised with respect to investment
law, banking law, and other commercial law fields. The rules
governing Palestinian tax powers were first established in the
Economic Protocol and were subsequently reconfirmed in a
slightly modified form by the Interim Agreement. These rules
and restrictions have engendered additional hurdles to Palestin-
ian economic development.
Under the Interim Agreement, the tax powers exercised by
the Palestinian Council are divided into two classes of taxes: in-
direct taxes and direct taxes. The Interim Agreement provides
that the Palestinian and Israeli tax administrations will each levy
and collect all indirect taxes in their respective areas of jurisdic-
tion. Such indirect taxes include a value added tax ("VAT"), a
purchase tax, and an import tax. At present, the areas under the
responsibility of the Palestinian tax authority include Gaza (ex-
cluding Israeli settlements and the IDF base) and Areas "A" and
"B" of the West Bank. Area "C" will continue to fall under the
responsibility of the tax departments of the Israeli Civil Adminis-
tration until such time as these areas are transferred to the Pales-
tinian Council in accord with the Interim Agreement.
The Palestinian Council is similarly empowered to levy all
direct taxes on economic activities in the areas under its admin-
istration, as well as on economic activity by residents living in
areas under the responsibility of the Israeli tax administration.
Direct taxes include an income tax on individuals and corpora-
tions, a property tax, a municipal tax, and fees. However, under
the August 1994 Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Pow-
ers and Responsibilities, 8 the Palestinian tax authority is empow-
ered to tax income earned by Palestinians and foreigners any-
where in the West Bank, except for settlements and IDF areas.
Thus, while the Palestinian Council is responsible for levying di-
rect taxes on all residents of Gaza (excluding Israeli settlements
and the IDF Base) and Areas "A" and "B" of the West Bank, it
may also levy income tax on all non-Israelis earning income in
Area "C" (excluding Israeli settlements or IDF areas).
58. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29,
1994, Isr.-PLO, 34 I.L.M. 455 (1995) (done in Cairo, August 19, 1994).
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The PNA established an income tax department and a VAT
department shortly after it came to power in 1994. During the
first year of Palestinian self-rule, inaccurate reporting by taxpay-
ers was rampant and resulted in low revenue. These difficulties
primarily arose as a result of a lack of trained personnel and
poor coordination with the outgoing Israeli Civil Administration
tax departments. For example, very few trained Palestinians
were available to perform the tasks previously discharged by Is-
raeli tax officers, particularly assessment and investigation. In
addition, the Palestinian tax departments commenced their op-
erations in Gaza and Jericho without any taxpayer files, despite
the fact that the Civil Administration had maintained a sophisti-
cated computerized taxpayer file system.
Following the transfer of tax powers in the West Bank, the
Palestinian tax departments sought to avoid the problems they
had experienced in Gaza and Jericho by initiating close coopera-
tion with Israel regarding personnel training and computer serv-
ices. Over two hundred Palestinian tax officers were hired and
sent to participate in specialized training courses established
through cooperation with the Israeli tax departments. Further-
more, the PNA contracted the services of SHAM, the Israeli com-
pany providing tax-related computer services to the Israeli Gov-
ernment. The efficiency and resources of the Palestinian tax de-
partments have thus dramatically improved since the early days
of self-rule.
Despite the improvements in the institutional capabilities of
the Palestinian tax departments, the actual tax laws and policies
continue to create serious hurdles for both revenue collection
and economic development. Furthermore, other hurdles have
arisen as a result of the implementation of various Israeli-Pales-
tinian agreements regarding coordination of tax policy and co-
operation in the area of tax administration. The most important
hurdles are apparent in three spheres of taxation: income taxa-
tion, VAT and purchase taxation, and import taxation.
1. Income Tax
The current income tax laws in the Palestinian Territories
are problematic for four reasons. First, as in other legal areas in
the region, the tax laws in the West Bank and Gaza are not uni-
form. The disharmony between West Bank and Gaza tax law se-
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riously complicates compliance and revenue collection for both
taxpayers and tax administrators. Second, the income tax stat-
utes are out of date. In Gaza, the relevant statute is the 1947
British Mandate Income Tax Ordinance1 9 while in the West
Bank it is the 1964 Jordanian Income Tax Law.6' Third, both
the tax regime and tax enforcement are made dauntingly com-
plex by the numerous amendments issued by the Israeli military
Governments in both territories between 1967 and 1994, as well
as by amendments issued by the Egyptian military Government
in Gaza between 1948 and 1967. Many of these military orders
are poorly drafted and ambiguously worded, creating a lack of
legal clarity and inviting excessive interpretive discretion by the
tax authorities. Fourth, in addition to these basic problems, the
tax laws contain provisions that constitute specific hurdles to de-
velopment.
The most crucial of the specific obstacles to development
engendered by the tax laws have been the inordinately high in-
come tax brackets and rates that the Israeli military government
established prior to the transfer of tax powers to the Palestinian
Authority. For example, the highest tax bracket in the Palestin-
ian Territories during the period of Israeli military rule was 55%.
By comparison, in Jordan the highest tax bracket is currently
45% and in Israel 48%. Moreover, during the period of Israeli
military rule, West Bank and Gaza taxpayers faced the highest
rate of taxation if their income exceeded the approximate
equivalent of US$16,000. By comparison, under current Israeli
law, taxpayers do not reach the highest tax bracket until their
annual income surpasses the approximate equivalent of
US$30,000.
Additional specific hurdles to Palestinian economic devel-
opment are posed by the required prepayment of income tax.
Under Israeli military orders, taxpayers must prepay estimated
income taxes based on payments from previous years. This re-
quirement constitutes a burden for taxpayers, generally, and for
small businesses, in particular, as it presumes these individuals
and entities enjoy a steady cash flow and ready access to credit
when, in fact, they often do not. Consequently, many Palestin-
59. Income Tax Ordinance No. 13 of 1947 (British Mandate), published in The
Palestine Gazette, No. 1568, Supplement No. 1, (Mar. 20, 1947).
60. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Income Tax Law, Law No. 25 (1964).
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ian businesses operate in the informal sector, evading taxes and
fostering inequities between firms that are capable of operating
informally and those that are not.
The Palestinian tax authorities are well aware of the
problems of the current tax laws. Certain regulatory changes
have already been made to ease the most burdensome proce-
dures and rules regarding tax brackets and rates. Furthermore,
an effort is now underway to unify and modernize the income
tax laws of the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian authorities have
relied on the assistance of international tax and legal experts to
this end and a draft Palestinian income tax law may be prepared
in the near future.
2. VAT and Purchase Tax Rates
VAT and purchase tax rates have been specially addressed
in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The interdependence of the
two economies, formally linked through the customs union
agreement, argues for coordination of certain aspects of tax pol-
icy and administration. Thus, Palestinian-Israeli agreements
have established special guidelines regarding VAT and purchase
tax rates. As a practical matter, these guidelines restrict the free-
dom of the Palestinian Council to set VAT and purchase tax
rates independently of Israel. While harmonization of VAT and
purchase tax rates between the two economies provides certain
theoretical macroeconomic benefits, the limits on independent
PNA policy formulation exact a definite economic cost.
The Interim Agreement provides that the Palestinian and
Israeli tax administrations will each levy and collect VAT and
purchase taxes in their respective areas of responsibility. Ac-
cording to the agreement, the purchase tax rates in both juris-
dictions will be identical for both locally produced and imported
goods. 6' The sole exception from this rule permits the Palestini-
ans to determine their own purchase tax rate on motor vehi-
cles.62 The Palestinian VAT rate, however, may be set one per-
cent to two percent lower than the Israeli rate.6" The Interim
Agreement also establishes that businesses under the Palestinian
tax authority's jurisdiction may not be exempt from VAT if their
61. Interim Agreement, supra note 5, annex V, art. 6.
62. Id. art. 3.
63. Id. art. 6. Currently, the Israeli value added tax ("VAT") rate is 17%.
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annual revenue exceeds US$12,000. 4  Finally, the Interim
Agreement provides rules for the clearance of VAT revenues be-
tween the Israeli and Palestinian VAT departments.
The arrangements for VAT clearance have raised several
problems for the Palestinian tax authority. By the terms of the
Interim Agreement, the Palestinian VAT department is to re-
ceive the VAT paid by Palestinians purchasing goods or services
in the Israeli economy. Similarly, the Israeli VAT department is
to receive the VAT paid by Israelis in the Palestinian economy.
In order to expedite clearance of Palestinian and Israeli VAT
claims, it was agreed that a special unified invoice must accom-
pany every transaction between Palestinian and Israeli busi-
nesses. 65 The VAT department of each side is to distribute the
invoices to businesses that sell goods and services to clients from
the other side. Upon receiving payment for the goods or serv-
ices rendered, the seller must issue an invoice specifying the
amount of VAT paid. The invoices must then be used to estab-
lish VAT clearance at monthly meetings between representatives
of the two VAT administrations. 66 Clearance claims are to be
settled within six days of each monthly meeting, through the is-
suance of a payment by the administration with the net balance
of claims against it. 67
Given the per capita income of the Palestinian Territories,
the minimum permissible VAT of fifteen percent is an unusually
high rate. Purchase taxes are also probably higher than they
would normally be, in the absence of a commitment to match
Israeli purchase taxes. The PNA agreed to harmonize its VAT
and purchase taxes with Israel as a necessary condition for free
access to the Israeli market for Palestinian goods. However, non-
implementation of free trade commitments as a result of the se-
curity closures has meant that Palestinians are, in effect, paying
the price of the customs union without enjoying its benefits. In
addition, the Palestinian VAT department has expressed con-
cern that Israel has not acted to implement the VAT clearance
arrangements. According to the Palestinians, many Israeli com-
panies selling products to clients in the Palestinian Territories
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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are neither provided with invoices, nor even made aware of their
existence. Furthermore, in the absence of sufficient logistical
support, the Palestinian VAT department has been unable to
monitor the movement of Israeli goods into the Palestinian terri-
tories. Thus, the Palestinian VAT department, which expects to
be owed between US$100 million and US$150 million on annual
VAT clearance with Israel, is presently in a weak position to en-
force compliance with VAT rules and to secure its interests
through VAT clearance procedures.
3. Import Tax
The essence of the customs union established between
Israel and the PNA is a harmonized import and customs policy.
With respect to external trade, Israel and the Palestinian Territo-
ries are treated as one economic entity. The goal of the customs
union is to prevent leakage of low-tariff imported goods from the
Palestinian Territories into Israel. Thus, according to the In-
terim Agreement, Palestinian import taxes must generally be set
no lower than the Israeli import taxes on equivalent goods.68
However, the Interim Agreement provides three lists of goods
for which Palestinian import taxes may be set independently of
the Israeli tax rates. Goods on the first two lists may be imported
to the Palestinian Territories in quantities agreed upon by the
two sides, according to the needs of domestic consumption in
the Palestinian market.6 9 Any such goods imported to the Pales-
tinian Territories in excess of the agreed-upon quantities are
subject to import taxes set no lower than the corresponding Is-
raeli import taxes.7" The third list comprises basic food items
and other goods required by the Palestinian economic develop-
ment program that may be imported in unrestricted quantities
subject to independently established Palestinian import taxes.71
Finally, imported motor vehicles may also be taxed at a rate set
independently of the Israeli customs rate.
The Interim Agreement also establishes a procedure for the
clearance of revenues from all import taxes and levies between
Israel and the PNA. The clearance of revenues is based on the
68. Id. art. 3.
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place of final destination.72 Thus, import taxes collected on
goods in Israel's territorial sea or in airports and destined for the
Palestinian territories are to be credited to the Palestinian cus-
toms administration. Revenue clearance is to be effected within
six working days from the date the import taxes are collected.7"
The first major problem with the scheme for import tax har-
monization established by the Interim Agreement is that, as with
VAT and purchase tax rates, the Palestinian customs rate is prob-
ably higher than it otherwise would be, in exchange for a non-
implemented free trade relationship with Israel. The second,
and more serious, problem is that the restrictions on the PNA's
ability to independently determine their own import policy sub-
stantially weakens their capacity to negotiate favorable trade
terms with third countries. Due to these restrictions, the PNA is
not in a position to offer favorable access to their domestic mar-
ket as a quid pro quo for reciprocal access to a given foreign mar-
ket. Thus, the PNA is largely dependent on Israeli trade policy
to open foreign markets to Palestinian products. This situation
is particularly unfortunate because the foreign markets that most
interest Palestinian exporters are often countries with which
Israel has little or no trade.
The third, and final, problem concerns import tax revenue
clearance. Because high-volume Israeli importers can generally
obtain lower unit costs and shipping rates than Palestinian im-
porters, Palestinian businesses often prefer to import through
Israeli firms. Furthermore, Palestinian businesses often prefer to
use Israeli importers in order to avoid costly delays resulting
from security checks. Thus, a large quantity of goods destined
for the Palestinian Territories arrive at Israeli sea and airports
marked as imports to Israel. Import taxes collected on these
goods by Israeli customs officials, therefore, accrue to the Israeli
treasury rather than the Palestinian treasury. Palestinian tax offi-
cials estimate that tens of millions of dollars of revenue, if not
more, is being lost annually on this basis.
The hurdles deriving from the income tax, VAT, purchase
tax, and import tax systems in the Palestinian Territories are
doubly significant. Not only do these hurdles place costly bur-
dens on entrepreneurs and other taxpayers, they also result in
72. Id.
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low public revenue with untold consequences for the stability of
the current political system. Reform of tax laws and policies, in-
cluding those deriving from agreements with Israel, is, therefore,
essential to ensuring an environment that is favorable to eco-
nomic development and political stability.
CONCLUSION
The Middle East peace process has moved mountains since
the September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles.
Most of the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank
are now living under the authority of a democratically elected
Palestinian Council. The IDF has departed from almost all Pal-
estinian cities. Several Arab and Muslim states have opened dip-
lomatic relations with Israel or initiated diplomatic and eco-
nomic contacts. Business leaders throughout the region are
joining forces to engage in joint ventures, trade, and other forms
of economic cooperation. However, for the Palestinians, the
process of building a free, prosperous, and stable society is far
from complete.
The structural and legal hurdles to achieving economic
growth and political stability in the Palestinian Territories repre-
sent a tremendous challenge to the Palestinian people. These
hurdles cannot be overcome easily or quickly. In surmounting
them, the Palestinians will require considerable support from
fellow Arabs, technical and financial assistance from the United
States and Europe, good faith and cooperation from Israel, and,
most importantly, resolve and determination from their own
people to make peace and self-determination succeed. In solv-
ing the structural and legal hurdles to national development, the
Palestinian leadership can be truly effective only if the Palestin-
ian people organize the mechanisms of civil society, develop po-
sitions on contemporary issues, and voice their opinions at every
level of public policy formulation.
The twentieth century has seen the emergence and develop-
ment of a Palestinian national consciousness that arose in a con-
text of protracted suffering and dispossession. With the imple-
mentation of self-government after so many decades of disen-
franchisement, the Palestinian nation is now at a crossroads. It
can choose the rule of law, democracy, and peace or poverty,
anarchy, and conflict. The recent resumption of terrorist attacks
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against Israel during late February and early March, 1996 is,
therefore, of the gravest possible concern. Not only do such at-
tacks result in the loss of numerous innocent lives and feed the
vicious cycle of violence and retribution, they threaten the very
foundations of the peace process by calling into question the
ability and commitment of Palestinian society to contain its radi-
cal elements. It is thus of inestimable importance that Palestin-
ian society and its political leaders make a strategic decision to
identify the cessation of all violence and terrorism as a primary
national interest, and move decisively to quell it.
The Palestinian future is not written in stone. In fact, the
Palestinians probably now have more control over their collec-
tive fate than ever before in their history. Furthermore, the level
of Palestinian control over the course of their national life is
continuing to rise. The Palestinians are now in a position to
make difficult choices concerning the direction of their national
future. As they begin tackling the numerous hurdles to achiev-
ing political stability and economic growth, they carry a
profound responsibility. Their choices will disproportionately
affect the fortunes of larger nations and the entire region. It has
long been said that the Palestinians are the key to peace in the
Middle East. It is also often said that the Middle East is the
lynchpin to ensuring the stability and peace of the World. Thus,
the success of the Palestinians in surmounting the hurdles
before them is a matter of truly global concern.
